Chapter XIV
Endnotes
1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Hiroshi Komatsu, Imperial Japanese Army. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Student, Army War College, Nov 41-Nov 42: Staff Officer (Training), 51st Air Training Division, Dec 42-May 44; Staff Officer (Intelligence and Supply), Fifth Air Army, May 44-Mar 45; Staff Officer (Operations), 13th Air Division, Mar 45-Aug 45. All source materials cited in this Chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
2 If such a move materialized, it was expected to be a limited operation employing three to five divisions and directed at the east coast of Luzon. The purpose of this attack, it was estimated, would be to draw Japanese strength eastward preparatory to later landings by the main invasion forces on the west coast of Luzon. Baler, Dingalan and Lamon Bays were considered the most probable landing points along the east coast, with possible secondary landings at Legaspi and/or Aparri. Dai Yon Kokugun oyobi Dai Juyon Homengun Shorui Tsuzuri (Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army : Operational Policy Outline for Luzon, 14 Nov 44.
3 Following the invasion of Leyte, the consensus of opinion of the Area Army staff was that the main effort of the enemy's eventual assault on Luzon would be directed at the west rather than the east coast of the island. Greater suitability of the west coast terrain for the deployment of large forces and proximity of the landing sites to the key strategic area of Manila were the main reasons for this estimate. (Statement by Maj. Eizo Hori, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Area Army.)
4 Fourth Air Army had surveyed Mindoro for air base sites which could be developed for operational use, but had found the terrain generally unfavorable. The only project undertaken by the Air Army was the improvement of an already existing strip near San Jose, on the southwest coast of the island, for auxiliary and emergency use. (Statement by Col. Misoo Matsumae, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Air Army.)
5 The preceding summary of Fourteenth Area Army's estimate of enemy plans and capabilities as of 7 November is based on the following sources: (1) Statement by Maj; Hori, previously cited. (2) Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Operational Policy Outline for Luzon, 14 Nov 44.
6 The staff discussions here referred to are dealt with more fully in Chapter XIII, pp. 384-7 and n. 158, p. 387.
7 The 68th Brigade had already been earmarked for Leyte in October and was scheduled to move to Manila early in November for transshipment. When the new Leyte reinforcement schedule was drawn up, only the first elements of the brigade had reached Luzon, and its movement was not actually completed until about 21 November.
8 Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit : Operational Policy Outline for Luzon, 14 Nov 44.
9 This plan, drawn up immediately after the arrival of General Yamashita in Manila to assume command of Fourteenth Area Army, was based on the original Sho-Go Operation concept of fighting the major ground battle in defense of the Philippines on Luzon. The essence of the plan was the concentration of three divisions, designated as "decisive battle forces", on the central Luzon plain ready for speedy deployment against enemy forces landing at one or more of three anticipated major invasion points, i. e. Lamon Bay, Lingayen Gulf and Batangas. If possible, decisive battle was to be fought on or near the beaches. Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit Operational Policy Outline for Decisive Battle in the Luzon Area, 11 Oct 44.
10 The Area Army attributed particular importance to the build-up of the three key defense areas but at the same time made every effort to maintain secrecy regarding the extent of the program in order to avoid a possible adverse effect on the morale of the forces on Luzon. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Toshio Nishimura, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army.
11 The 12th Surface Raiding Regiment formed part of the 3d Surface Raiding Force, assigned to the Lingayen area. Additional elements of the force were at Manila awaiting transshipment north. When the enemy landed on Mindoro on 15 December, however, Fourteenth Area Army decided to keep these elements in Manila Bay to strengthen the bay defenses. The 3d Surface Raiding Force was transferred the same day to direct Area Army command and assumed control of all Army surface raiding units in the Manila Bay area. Organization and tactics of Army and Navy surface raiding units are treated in Chapter XVII.
12 The headquarters of the Manila Defense Force was activated at Manila on 1 November, under orders from Tokyo, to command the miscellaneous troops units in the Manila area.
13 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Yonkan Mindoro To Sento Gaishi (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. IV: General Outline of Mindoro Operations) 1st Demobi lization Bureau, Nov 49, pp. 1-2.
14 General sources covering the disposition of Fourteenth Area Army forces in the Luzon area as of 13 December are as follows: (1) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Sankan Ruson To ni okeru Sakusen (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. III: Operations on Luzon) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 49.51 and Attached Map No. 1-A. (2) Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-217, 8 Dec 44. ADVATIS Bulletin No. 414, 13 Mar 45, pp. 1-4.
15 The first echelon included 23d Division headquarters and the 64th and 72d Infantry Regiments. Submarine attacks sank several troop transports in the convoy, with heavy losses to both regiments as well as to the division staff. (Statement by Lt. Col. Masaichi Takahashi, Staff Officer (Operations), 23d Division.)
16 The first echelon of the loth Division comprised the major portion of the 39th Infantry Regiment and some division troops. The division headquarters moved to Manila by air about the same time as the arrival of the first echelon convoy. The second echelon of the 23d Division included the 71st Infantry Regiment, the division engineer regiment, and an independent artillery battalion. (1) Dai Ju Shidan (Tetsu Heidan) Shijitsu Shiryo [Historical Data, 10th Division (Tetsu Force)] Home Depot Division, 15 Feb 47. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Takahashi, previously cited.
17 Cf. Chapter XIII, pp. 399, 401.
18 Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-217, ADVATIS Bulletin No. 414, 13 Mar 45.
19 This figure included the crews from sunken vessels who had been absorbed by the naval ground combat forces. Senkyuhyakuyonjuyon oyobi Yonjugo Nen Zai Hito Nihon Gun Heiryoku (Strength of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1944-45) 1 st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, Nov-Dec 49.
20 During November over 23,000 tons of ammunition and rations were shipped from Luzon to Leyte, more than half the amount being sunk in transit. Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Nikan Furoku Reite Sakusen Kiroku (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. II Supplement: Leyte Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 149-50.
21 About 80 per cent of food supplies shipped to the Philippines from Thailand and French Indo-China, which were the major sources, were lost in transit due to ship sinkings. Unpublished memoirs of Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army, Hitosen no Jisso (The Truth of the Philippines Campaign) 15 Jun 47, p. 17.
22 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 46.
23 Senkyo Shubo (Daily Record of the War Situation) Operations Section, Army General Staff. 11 Oct 44-Jul 45.
24 In addition to these forces, 150 special-attack planes were currently on Formosa. These were ordered on 14 December to proceed to the Philippines as reinforcements for the First Combined Base Air Force. Dai Niji Sekai Taisen Ryakureki Otsu BIu (Abridged Chronicle of World War II, B) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46, Part III, p. 25.
25 Gunreibu Socho no Sojosho (Report to the Throne by Chief of Navy General Staff) 1 4 Dec 44. (After surviving the Battle for Leyte Gulf, in which they operated with Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa's northern decoy force, Ise and Hyuga were ordered to Lingga in November to strengthen the Second Striking Force.)
26 Operational strength in home waters as of mid-December compiled by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Chief, Planning Sub-Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section. (The Battle for Leyte Gulf had reduced fleet carrier strength to five ships. Two carriers were subsequently commissioned, of which one, the 62,000-ton supercarrier Shinano, was sunk by enemy submarine attack on 29 November during her shakedown run.)
27 (1) Report to the Throne by the Chief of Navy General Staff, op. cit., 14 Dec 44. (2) Statements by Comdr. Tadao Kusumi and Comdr. Shigeichi Yamamoto, both Staff Officers (Operations), Southwest Area Fleet.
28 Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono San (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part III) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Nov 47, pp. 3-5. (American naval records covering the Mindoro operation indicate that the flagship of the invasion task force, the U.S.S. Nashville, was severely damaged in this attack, forcing the transfer of the command staff to a destroyer.)
29 Hito Koku Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki (Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, Appended Chart No. 17.
30 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part 111, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
31 The total number of sorties flown against the invasion convoy during 14 December was 69, broken down as follows: By Fourth Air Army-29, of which 16 were special-attack planes. By First Combined Base Air Force-40, of which 33 were Kamikaze planes. Twenty-one Army and 18 Navy planes failed to return. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (2) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ni (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 47, p. 103.
32 (1) Statement by Major Hori, previously cited. (2) 17th Infantry Regiment (8th Division) Operations Order, 14 Dec 44. Eighth Army ADVATIS Translation No. 11, 12 Jan 45.
33 The Nagayoshi Detachment was relieved by this order of its mission, assigned four days earlier, to prepare for the Ketsu Operation on Leyte, and was placed under command of the Manila Defense Force. Fourteenth Area Army assumed direct command of the 71st Infantry Regiment, 23d Division, which had arrived in Manila on 11 December.
34 (1) Southwest Area Fleet estimated that the enemy invasion force would penetrate through Mindoro or Tablas Strait during the night of the 14th and attempt a dawn landing in Tayabas Bay or the vicinity of Batangas. Landings in Manila or Subic Bays during the 15th were considered possible alternatives. Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part III, op. cit., pp. 7-8. (2) Statement by Col. Matsumae, previously cited.
35 Available Japanese sources covering ground operations on Mindoro indicate that the small elements present in the San Jose area attempted virtually no hostile action against the enemy landing force prior to withdrawing toward Bulalacao. This is confirmed by American operational accounts, which mention minor skirmishing on Caminawit Point, location of the navy seaplane base, as the only action which took place. The day following the landing, the 17th Infantry Regiment at Batangas ordered the Bulalacao garrison unit, consisting of another small element of the 1st Provisional Infantry Company, to go to the assistance of the San Jose force. On 17 December, this unit took up positions in the hills northwest of Bulalacao and was there joined on the 18th by the elements retreating from San Jose. The combined forces continued to occupy positions in this sector until 24 January when they were attacked by an enemy force and compelled to disperse inland. Mindoro To Sento ni kansuru Hokoku (Mindoro Oper ations Special Report) Home Depot Division, undated.
36 Actual results of the first attack, according to American records, were two LST's sunk and one destroyer damaged. Army air action against the landing was limited to an attack by one suicide plane at dusk on the 15th. In addition to the attacks on the landing point, 17 sorties were flown by naval aircraft based on Cebu and Mindanao against enemy invasion shipping in the Sulu Sea. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (2) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p 103.
37 Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army Radio No. 328 (Secret Urgent) to Chief of Staff Southern Army, 14 Dec 44. (Plate No. 104 is the facsimile of the same message as received by Fourth Air Army)
38 Statement by Maj. Gen. Nishimura, previously cited.
39 On 16 December, the day following the enemy landing at San Jose, Southwest Area Fleet radioed to the 43d Destroyer Division, which had left Manila on the 14th en route to Indo-China, to turn back and execute a hit-and-run night attack on the enemy anchorage. The commander of the destroyer division, however, failed to obey this order because of insufficient fuel, and his ships continued on to Indo-China. On 20 December, therefore, Southwest Area Fleet ordered Vice Adm. Shima, Second Striking Force commander, to organize and dispatch a task group to execute the attack. This plan was not changed upon receipt of the Combined Fleet instructions to press for a counterlanding, because Southwest Area Fleet was anxious to take advantage of a momentary laxity in enemy precautions off the San Jose beachhead and also doubted that a counterlanding operation would materialize. (Statement by Comdr. Kusumi, previously cited.)
40 The joint policy outline drawn up by the Army and Navy Sections stated: "Extreme effort will be made to obstruct the utilization by the enemy of bases on Mindoro." The Army Section's supplementary draft, bearing on the same point, stated: "The defenses of air bases in the Bacolod (Negros) area, on Palawan and Mindoro will be strengthened; and even in the worst circumstances troop strength will be reinforced as necessary with the objective of obstructing enemy use of these bases." Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Draft Outline of Sho No. 1 Operational Policy to Meet Current Conditions; and Draft Basis for Imperial General Headquarters Study of Policy to Meet Current Conditions in the Sho No. 1 Area, 18 Dec 44.
41 (1) Data concerning the policy discussions which took place in Manila during the period 17-23 December are based on a joint statement by the following high-level participants: Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section; Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura, Chief of Staff, Southern Army; Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Haruo Konuma, Deputy-Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Area Army.
42 Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part III, op. Cit., p. 15.
44 The raiding detachment was a specially organized provisional unit which included a small number that originally belonged to the Gi-Go Airborne Raiding Unit. (Cf. Chapter XIII, p. 393, n. 179) (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 11. (2) Statement by Sgt. Naoji Sato, member of the Mindoro raiding detachment.
45 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. IV, pp. 11-2, and Attached Map No. 2.
46 During the period 16 December to 5 January, Army aircraft flew a total of 213 sorties, of which 53 were special-attack planes, against enemy resupply convoys en route to Mindoro. Naval planes flew a total of 110 sorties against enemy shipping and 86 sorties against airfields on Mindoro. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (2) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part III, op. cit., pp. 12-4.
47 Immediately after the invasion of Mindoro, the Batangas area was rated the most probable landing point of the main enemy forces. In this event, a secondary landing was considered likely in the Lingayen area. Conversely, if the main landing took place at Lingayen, a secondary landing in Batangas was expected. In either case, it was considered probable that the enemy would also make an additional landing at Aparri and effect airborne landings on central Luzon, especially in the vicinity of Manila. (Statement by Maj. Hori, previously cited.)
48 With the invasion of Mindoro, Fourteenth Area Army scrapped the November reinforcement plan for Leyte, under which the 23d and 10th Divisions were to have been shipped to that island. This action was sanctioned by the Imperial General Headquarters draft outline of future operational policy for the Philippines, dated 18 December, which provided that the 23d, 10th and 19th Divisions should be assembled on Luzon as speedily as possible to hasten preparations for the defense of the main island. Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit Draft Basis for Imperial General Headqurters Study of Policy to Meet Current Conditions in the Sho No. 1 Area, 18 Dec 44.
49 The conclusions reached by the Area Army command generally accorded with the views of the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters respecting Luzon defense. In the event of a full scale enemy landing on Luzon, the maximum strength permitted by the over-all situation, particularly air and sea sure-destructive [special-attack] forces, will be committed to that area in order to destroy the invading forces. Even in the most unfavorable situation, the main strength [of the forces on Luzon] will employ key areas in central and northern Luzon as bases and conduct long-term operations with the objective of destroying or consuming enemy combat strength, thereby obstructing his plans with respect to other areas (Ryukyus, Formosa, China coast, etc.) and facilitating over-all operations of the armed forces. Ibid.
50 Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Operational Policy Outline for Luzon, 19 Dec 44. (Portions textually quoted are Parts I and II. Part III outlined the general missions of forces, more specifically covered in the separate appendices issued 20 December.)
51 Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Operational Policy Outline for Luzon, 20 Dec 44.
52 An Area Army order issued on 17 December had already directed the 23d Division to assume command of the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and take over the defense of the entire Lingayen area below the southern boundary of the road Division near Suyo. When it received this order, the division had just completed moving its main strength from San Fernando, where it had disembarked on 2 December, to Umingan and San Jose under a previous Area Army order to organize defensive positions in those sectors. Cf. pp. 409-10.
53 The Area Army, on 18 December, had already ordered the headquarters and first echelon elements of the 10th Division, less the 39th Infantry Regiment, reinf., which had already been deployed to Bataan under command of the Manila Defense Force, to move to the San Jose area and construct defensive positions in the zone vacated by the 23d Division.
54 After the enemy landing on Mindoro, the 6th Tank Regiment had moved back from Los Banos, in Batangas, and was in the vicinity of Manila when the new operational plans were issued on 19-20 December.
55 Upon its attachment to the Manila Defense Force on 14 December for the reinforcement of Bataan, the Nagayoshi Detachment was ordered to assume command of the minor Manila Defense Force elements already stationed in the Bataan area.
56 The draft agreement further provided that the 31st Special Naval Base Force commander should exercise unified command of Army and Navy units assigned to defense of the Manila Bay mouth. After the start of land fighting, however, Fourteenth Area Army was to control the base force in all matters connected with ground operations. Documents of Fourth Air Army and Fourteenth Area Army, op. cit: Operational Policy Outline for Luzon.
57 The headquarters and 1st Battalion reached Binalonan on 24 December, followed by the 2d Battalion on 31 December-1 January. The 3d Battalion remained in the Manila area under temporary command of the Manila Defense Force until 28 December and only rejoined the regiment in the Sison sector on 13 January, four days after the enemy landing on Lingayen Gulf. (1) Statement by Lt. Col. Takahashi, previously cited. (2) Manila Defense Force Operations Order No. 115, 28 Dec 44. XIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XIVCAET 0079, 27 Feb 45 .
58 Arrival of the third echelon completed the transshipment of the division from Formosa to Luzon. Losses sustained in transit by all three echelons aggregated 30 per cent of division strength, in addition to large quantities of equipment and supplies. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, Appended Chart.
59 Shipment of the loth Division was carried out in only two echelons, the second including all division strength which had not been transported to Manila in the first part of December. (Cf. n. 16.) Main components of the second echelon were the loth and 63d Infantry Regiments, the remaining strength of the 39th Infantry Regiment, and elements of division troops. Submarine attacks on the San Fernando-bound section of the convoy shortly before it reached port resulted in the loss of three infantry battalions and most of the division transport regiment. Historical Data, loth Division (Tetsu Force), op. cit.
60 Under the 19-20 December plans, this mission was assigned to elements of the 19th Division in order to permit the concentration of maximum loth Division strength in the San Jose-Umingan-Natividad area. The change in plan was caused by fear that it would be dangerous to postpone bolstering the defenses of the Cagayan Valley until arrival of the 19th Division, which might be delayed by shipping difficulties. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.)
61 The first and second echelons of the division, comprising the 73d Infantry Regiment, the 75th Infantry Regiment less 3d Battalion, the 76th Infantry Regiment less 2d and 3d Battalions, and the major portion of supporting division troops, arrived by the same convoy. The third echelon, including all remaining elements, never left Formosa due to the complete interdiction of Luzon-bound shipping just prior to and following the Lingayen landing. (State ment by Lt. Gen. Yoshiharu Ozaki, commander, 19th Division.)
62 Formation of the 1st Airborne Raiding Group, which was to absorb the 2d Parachute Group and Troop Carrier Air Regiment already in the Philippines, was ordered by the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation on 26 November. The Group headquarters was organized in Kyushu but was ordered to remain in Japan until additional component units had moved to the Philippines. The additional airlift units flew to Clark Field prior to the waterborne movement of the 1st and 2d Glider Infantry Regiments and supporting machine-gun, engineer and signal units. Transports carrying the 1st Glider Infantry Regiment and the engineer unit were sunk en route, and, these elements never reached the Philippines. The headquarters was ordered on 27 December to proceed by air to Clark Field, where it arrived on 8 January. (1) Inspectorate General of Army Aviation Operations Order No. A-29, 26 Nov 44. Sixth Army ADVATIS Translation 6AAET 0361, 26 Feb 45. (2) Statements by Maj. Koji Tanaka, Staff Officer (Air), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and Col. Yasuji Okada, Chief of Staff, 1st Airborne Raiding Group. (3) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. Cit. Vol. III, Suppl. 2 (Kembu Group Operations in the Clark Sector), pp. 2-3.
63 The division was to assume command of miscellaneous elements already in the area and organize its main positions from the heights west of Antipolo to the vicinity of Morong, on the north shore of Laguna de Bay. The left flank was to be guarded by secondary positions north and east of Pililla. Documents of Fourth Air Army and Four teenth Area Army, op. cit: Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-268, 23 Dec 44.
64 (1) Ibid. (2) The Noguchi Detachment, organized under this order, was made up of the 81st Infantry Brigade headquarters, the 182d and 185th Independent Infantry Battalions, and the 26th Independent Mixed Regiment less 3d Battalion. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Yoshitake Tsuda, commander 105th Division.)
65 From 17 December until shortly before the enemy landing at Lingayen, carrier-based air attacks on Luzon were inconsequential. However, land-based planes operating from Leyte and later from Mindoro conducted almost daily bombing raids throughout this period, forcing movements over the railway and highway network to be limited largely to night time. For the period 17-31 December, an average of sixty-five planes a day were reported attacking Luzon targets. Senkun Tokuho Dai Yonjuyon-go Ruson To Sakusen ni okeru Kyokun narabini Keika no Gaiyo (Battle Lessons Special Report No. 44: Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 29 Mar 45, Appended Chart No. 2.
66 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Nihyakukyujuni-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-292) 27 Dec 44.
67 Statement by Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourteenth Area Army. (Upon formation of the Shimbu Group, this officer was temporarily assigned to duty on the staff of the Group headquarters.)
68 On 28 December, following the organization of the Shimbu Group, the Bataan area, with the exception of the southern tip of the peninsula, was transferred from the Manila Defense Force sector of responsibility to that of the 2d Armored Division. Effective the same date, the Nagayoshi Detachment came under 2d Armored Division command.
69 Shobu Sakumei Ko Dai Sambyakuichi-go (Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. A-300 29 Dec 44.
70 It was not until 4 January, two days before the enemy invasion fleet entered Lingayen Gulf, that the Area Army concluded definitely that Lingayen would be the main point of attack. The main reason for this conclusion was the sudden shift of enemy bombing attacks from airfields to key bridges between Lingayen and Manila. The Area Army continued to regard a secondary landing in the Batangas area as probable. (Statement by Maj. Hori, previously cited.)
71 Daily Record of the War Situation, op. Cit., 2 Jan 45.
73 Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.
74 Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (American naval records show that only one ship, the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, was hit in these attacks. Damage was so severe that the carrier had to be sunk by an accompanying destroyer.)
75 Available Japanese documentary sources covering air operations during this period give figures only for the number of suicide aircraft and escorting fighters employed in special-attack missions and contain no data regarding ordinary attack missions. The total number of planes sent out on special-attack missions on 5 January was 30, of which only five were escort fighters. More than 18 suicide planes failed to return, but only seven were definitely reported to have crashed into enemy ships. (1) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 103 (2) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (According to American official sources, nine ships were actually damaged on 5 January by suicide plane crashes or near misses ; no ships were sunk.)
76 (1) The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 31. (2) Statement by Maj. Gen. Konuma, previously cited.
77 The force organized by the 2d Armored Division to assume this mission was designated the Shigemi Detach ment. The detachment was to come under direct Area Army command as soon as it reached the north bank of the Agno River. 2d Armored Division Operations Order No. A-88, 7 Jan 45. ATIS Bulletin No. 1814, 27 Feb 45, pp. 1-4.
78 Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., p. 31.
79 A total of 58 suicide aircraft and 17 escorting fighters took part in the strikes against enemy ships in Lingayen Gulf and off San Fernando and Iba during 6 January. (1) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 103. (2) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (American naval records show that one ship was sunk and 14 others damaged in these attacks. Seriously damaged ships included the battleship New Mexico and California.)
80 For a time after its debarkation at San Fernando on 27 December, the division was engaged in transporting its equipment and supplies from the beaches to an assembly point at Naguilian. It was then ordered to stand by to assist in unloading a fuel and ammunition convoy expected to reach San Fernando shortly. This convoy had not arrived by 6 January. The Truth of the Philippines Campaign, op. cit., p. 32.
81 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 72- 4.
82 Fourteenth Area Army Operations Order No. 368, 8 Jan 45. ADVATIS Bulletin No. 278, 15 Feb 45
83 The 19th Division had previously been scheduled to concentrate in the "Triangle Hill" sector. This sector, located south of San Leon, was so named by the Japanese because of three prominent hill features forming a triangle. Mt. Bangcay was at the southern corner of the triangle.
84 The Tsuda Detachment came under 10th Division command effective the same day as the Area Army order of 8 January. 10 th Division Operations Order No. A-45, 8 Jan 45. I Corps ADVATIS Translation ICAET 0185, 25 Apr 45.
85 Summary of Operations and Battle Lessons, Luzon Campaign, op. cit., pp. p. 2.
86 The number of sorties flown by army planes on 7-8 January is not known. Naval Kamikaze flew two missions with a combined total of 12 suicide planes and 11 escort fighters on 7 January, and only one sortie by a single suicide plane on the 8th. Nine Kamikaze and seven escorts made final sorties on the 9th. A total of 17 enemy ships were reported hit by Army and Navy suicide planes between 7-9 January. (r) Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., pp. 803-4. (2) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., Appended Chart 17. (According to American naval records, no ships were sunk by suicide planes during this period, but seven ships were damaged. One ship, HMAS Australia, was hit three times.)
87 Fourth Air Army headquarters transferred from Manila to Echague between 7 and 10 January preparatory to a general withdrawal of combat air units to northern Luzon bases for reorganization. These bases were found inadequate, however, and the headquarters withdrew to Formosa on 15 January under a plan to carry out the reorganization there. With the exception of one fighter company and reconnaissance elements which were to remain at northern Luzon bases, all combat air units on Luzon were to evacuate their remaining strength (mainly personnel) to Formosa. It was planned to complete the reorganization of three fighter regiments, one reconnaissance regiment, and one fighter-bomber regiment by 20 February, when these units would be redeployed to the Philippines if the situation permitted. (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 122, 125-6, 130-3. (2) Statement by Col. Matsumae, previously cited.
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